A few months after the end of the 2003 Iraq war, on June 4, 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced that the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that he chaired would "as a part of its ongoing oversight of the intelligence community...conduct a Review of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs), the intelligence supporting the supposed possession of these weapons being one justification for the U.S. and its allies going to war with Iraq. The fact that only traces of a WMD program were found in Iraq after the war, the committee concluded, called for a review of that intelligence. The official name of the investigation was the "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq". When the first part of the report was released on July 9, 2004, Senator Roberts summarized, "In the end, what the president and the Congress used to send the country to war was information that was provided by the intelligence community, and that information was flawed." (Jones, 2004)
The Committee
Republican Pat Roberts, Kansas served as Chairman and the Committee included the Republicans Orrin G. Hatch, Utah; Mike DeWine, Ohio; Christopher S. Bond, Missouri; Trent Lott, Mississippi; Olympia J. Snowe, Maine, Chuck Hagel, Nebraska; Saxby Chambliss, Georgia and John W. Warner, Virginia.
Democrat John D. Rockefeller, IV, West Virginia served as Vice Chairman and the Committee included the Democrats Carl Levin, Michigan; Dianne Feinstein, California Ron Wyden, Oregon; Richard J. Durbin, Illinois; Evan Bayh, Indiana; John Edwards, North Carolina and Barbara A. Mikulski, Maryland.
Conclusions of the Report
The first part of the Report was released July 9, 2004. The second part, to be completed later, was to be dedicated to exploring the "interaction or the pressure or the shaping of intelligence" by the Bush administration, as Senator Rockefeller put it (Jones, 2004).
During the press conference at the release of the report, Senator Roberts highlighted some of the conclusions that the Committee drew from their investigations:
"First of all, most of the key judgments in the October 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraq’s WMD programs were either overstated or were not supported by the raw intelligence reporting....
"Second, in the committee’s view, the intelligence community did not accurately or adequately explain the uncertainties behind the judgments in the October 2002 national intelligence estimate to policy-makers, both in the executive branch and here on Capitol Hill....
"Third, the committee concluded that the intelligence community was suffering from what we call a collective group-think, which led analysts and collectors and managers to presume that Iraq had active and growing WMD programs. This group-think caused the community to interpret ambiguous evidence, such as the procurement of dual-use technology, as conclusive evidence of the existence of WMD programs....
"Fourth, the committee concluded that in a few significant instances the analysis in the NIE suffered what we call a layering effect. Assessments were built or were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainty of those judgments. This is what we have termed the intelligence assumption train....
"Fifth, the committee concluded there was a failure by intelligence community managers to adequately encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, to fully consider alternative arguments, to accurately characterize intelligence reporting and to counsel analysts who had lost their objectivity.
"Sixth, the committee concluded that there were significant shortcomings on almost every aspect of the intelligence community’s human intelligence collection efforts against the Iraqi WMD target....
"Seventh, the committee concluded the CIA abused its unique position in the intelligence community to the detriment of this nation’s prewar analysis in regards to Iraq’s WMD programs. In a number of cases, the CIA sequestered significant reportable intelligence and prevented information from being shared with...source analysts at other intelligence agencies....
"Finally, the committee found no evidence that the intelligence community’s mischaracterization or exaggeration of intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities was the result of politics or pressure." (Roberts, 2004)
See Also
Butler Review, Iraq Intelligence Commission, Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, 2003 Invasion of Iraq,
References
