Many nations may find it in their advantage to maintain a policy of deliberate ambiguity. It may be useful if they have contrary foreign and domestic policy goals, or if they want to take advantage of risk aversion to abet a deterrence strategy. Such a policy can be very risky as it may cause misinterpretation of a nation's intentions, leading to actions that run counter to that nation's wishes.

Examples

• United States
  • Whether it would retaliate from a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons; specifically, during the Persian Gulf War (President George H. W. Bush later said they were bluffing in this case).
  • Whether it would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by the People's Republic of China. This policy was intended to discourage both an unilateral declaration of independence by ROC leaders and an invasion of Taiwan by the PRC. The United States has since been much less ambiguous after George W. Bush promised to "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan, but has continued express dissatisfaction over moves towards a UDI. The US and several other nations have long felt a need to be ambiguous regarding Taiwan; see Foreign relations of the Republic of China.

• Israel
  • Whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons (most believe it does; see Israel and weapons of mass destruction).
  • Whether it planned to assassinate Yassir Arafat.

External links

• Arms Control Association: U.S. Nuclear Policy: "Negative Security Assurances"